Abstract In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected forest on the player set. Players in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the forest. We introduce a new (single-valued) solution concept which is a generalization of the average tree solution defined and characterized by Herings et al. [2008] for TU-games played on a forest. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. It belongs to the precore of a restricted multi-choice game whenever the underlying multi-choice game is superadditive and isotone. We also link our solution with the hierarchical outcomes (Demange, 2004) of some particular TU-games played on trees. Finally, we propose two possible economic applications of our average tree solution.
Introduction
In the classical cooperative game theory, it is assumed that each player has only two options concerning cooperation, being either active or inactive, and that any coalition of players may form. In order to model in a more accurate way real situations, several extensions of the classical cooperative game in characteristic function form (TU-game) have been proposed. We consider two of them in this article.
The first extension is the class of multi-choice games. Whereas in a TU-game each player is either active or inactive, in a multi-choice context each player may have additional participation opportunities in a finite set of activity levels. Several solutions for multi-choice games have been defined: Hsiao and Raghavan [1993] generalized the Shapley value from TU-games to multichoice games in which all players have the same number of activity levels; van den Nouweland et al. [1995] and Grabisch and Xie [2007] generalized the core, the dominance core and the Weber set from TU-games to multi-choice games. Other Shapley-like values and their axiomatic isotone, then our average tree solution belongs to the precore of the restricted game. We give a simple condition under which it belongs to the core of the restricted game. Finally our solution is applied to measure a kind of average marginal productivity of each unit of input in a model of production and to distribute the cartel's profit generated by each unit in the price of each firm in a cooperative version of Hotelling's oligopoly on a tree with fixed locations.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 is a preliminary section containing concepts from multi-choice games and graph games, including the definition of the restricted game. In Section 3, we define the three properties for (single-valued) solutions on the class of multi-choice forest games and we initiate the axiomatic study. In Section 4, we give the expression of the unique solution satisfying these three properties. In Section 5, we show the average tree solution belongs to the pre-core of the restricted game provided that the underlying multi-choice games is superadditive and isotone. In Section 6, we discuss the above-mentioned applications.
Preliminaries

Notations
We denote by |A| the cardinality of a finite set A. Given x ∈ R n + , ||x|| denotes the Minkowski norm of order 1, i.e. ||x|| = n i=1 x i .
Multi-choice games
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set of players of size n ∈ N. In a multi-choice (cooperative) game, each player i ∈ N has a finite number of activity levels at which he or she can choose to play. The worth that the set of players N can obtain depends on the activity of the cooperative players. We set A i = {0, 1, . . . , m i } as the finite set of activity levels of player i ∈ N , where action 0 means that player i does not participate. Let A S be the product set i∈S A i , S ⊆ N , S = ∅. Elements a of A N are called coalitions. We will use sometimes the notation (a S , a N \S ) ∈ A S × A N \S instead of a ∈ A N in order to insist on the activity levels played by the sets of players S and N \S. Denote by S(a) the support of coalition a ∈ A N , i.e. S(a) = {i ∈ N : a i > 0}. The set of coalitions A N endowed with the usual binary relation ≥ on R n induced a (complete) lattice with greatest element m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) and least element 0 N = (0, 0, . . . , 0). For any two coalitions a and b of A N , a ∨ b and a ∧ b denote their least upper bound and their greatest lower bound respectively. A characteristic function is a real-valued function v : A N −→ R which assigns to every coalition a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A N the worth that the players can obtain when each player i ∈ N plays at activity level a i ∈ A i . By convention, the worth v(0 N ) of the null coalition 0 N is set to zero. A multi-choice game on N is given by a pair (A N , v) where A N is the set of coalitions and v the characteristic function. In case
, where 2 N stands for the set consisting of all subsets of N , so that (A N , v) is a TU-game. Given a multi-choice game (A N , v) and a coalition b ∈ A N , b = 0 N , we write (A b N , v) the multi-choice subgame obtained from
Communication graphs
In this article, we study multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an acyclic communication graph. A communication graph on the player set N is a pair (N, L) where the player set N represents the nodes of the graph and L is a subset of N × N . Each pair {i, j} ∈ L represents a communication link between player i and player j. In order to save notations, we write ij instead of {i, j} to refer to a link. For each i ∈ N , the set L i denotes the set of neighbors of i in (N, L), i.e the set of j ∈ N such that ij ∈ L. A finite sequence of distinct players
is acyclic if it does not contain any cycle. For each subset of players C ⊆ N , the subset of links L(C) ⊆ L represents the set of communication links between players in C, and the pair (C,
is connected if there exists at least one path between any pair of distinct players in C. The subgraph (C, L(C)) is maximally connected if it connected and for each i ∈ N \C the subgraph
there is exactly one path between any pair of distinct players who belong to the same component. An acyclic graph is called a forest. If the forest has exactly one component, it is called a tree. Therefore, each component of a forest induces a tree. It follows from these remarks that the class of acyclic graphs on N is closed under link deletion, i.e. if (N, L) is a forest or a tree, then the graph (N, L\ij) for ij ∈ L is a forest on N .
An orientation of a graph (N, L) is a directed graph obtained from (N, L) by replacing each link ij by either the directed link (i, j) or the directed link (j, i). Given a forest (N, L), a rooted tree t C r on the subgraph (C, L(C)) is an orientation that arises from a component C ∈ N/L by selecting player r ∈ C, called the root, and directing all links of L(C) away from the root r. Because r belongs to exactly one component of (N, L), we will use the notation t r instead of t C r when no confusion arises. Each agent r ∈ N is the root of exactly one rooted tree t r . Note also that for any rooted tree t r on (N, L), any agent k ∈ C\{r}, there is exactly one directed link (j, k); agent j is the unique predecessor of k and k is a successor of j in t r . Denote by s r (j) the possibly empty set of successors of player j in t r . A player k is a subordinate of j in t r if there is a directed path from j to k, i.e. if there is a sequence of distinct agents (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i p ) such that i 1 = j, i p = k and for each q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p − 1}, i q+1 ∈ s r (i q ). The set S r (j) denotes the union of the set of all subordinates of j in t r and {j}. So, we have s r (j) ⊆ S r (j)\{j}. A rooted tree reflects the idea that two players incident to a communication link do not have equal access or control to that link.
Multi-choice forest games
The combination of a multi-choice game and a communication graph on N results in a multi-choice graph game given by a triple (A N , v, L), where A N is the set of coalitions, v the characteristic function and L the set of communication links of the graph (N, L). Let us denote by C N the set of all multi-choice forest games (A N , v, L) on N and by C * N ⊆ C N the set of multi-choice tree games (A N , v, L) on N . If (A N , v) is a TU-game, then we say the combination of a TU-game and a communication graph results in a graph game.
In a multi-choice graph game (A N , v, L), the members of the support of coalition a ∈ A N can cooperate and earn their worth v(a) if they can communicate through the links of the communication graph (N, L), i.e if (S(a), L(S(a)) is a connected subgraph of (N, L). If S(a) does not induce a connected subgraph, we follow Myerson [1977] and assume that players in S(a) can only realize the sum of the worths of the components on the subgraph (S(a), L(S(a)). This yields a restricted multi-choice game (A N , v L ) define as:
In case A N = {0, 1} n , the restricted multi-choice game (A N , v L ) coincides with the restricted game introduced by Myerson [1977] for graph games.
Solution concepts for multi-choice forest games
In multi-choice (forest) games, a payoff vector is defined for any player participating at any level. Given (A N , v, L) ∈ C N , we introduce the set V consisting of all pairs (i, k) where i ∈ N and k ∈ A i . A payoff vector x is an element of R V . Each coordinate x i,k ∈ R of x represents the payoff variation to player i corresponding to an increase of activity from level k − 1 to k, and x i,0 = 0 for each i ∈ N . Therefore, if a player i works at level k ∈ A i , then he or she obtains, according to x, the amount
A single-valued solution on C N , also called an allocation rule, is a function f :
denotes the sum of accumulated payoffs received by the players in S ⊆ N when each one chooses its greatest activity level m i ∈ A i , i ∈ S, i.e.
In a multi-choice forest games
A payoff vector x ∈ R V is level-increased rational if for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ A i , it holds that
where e i is the vector in R n such that e i j = 0 if j ∈ N \{i}, and e i j = 1 if j = i. This means that x i,k is at least the increase in worth that player i can obtain when he or she is the only one to participate and changes his or her activity from level k − 1 to k. A payoff vector is an imputation if it is efficient and level-increased rational. A payoff vector is x acceptable if for each coalition a ∈ A N , it holds that
, is the set of efficient and acceptable payoff vectors. Note that
, is the set of acceptable imputations.
Properties for allocation rules
In this section we introduce three properties for allocation rules on C N . The first one is a generalization of the property of component efficiency from graph games to the class of multi-choice forest games. Component efficiency for graph games is itself a generalization of the property of efficiency from TU-games to graph games. It has been introduced by Myerson [1977] in order to characterize, together with a property of fairness, the so-called Myerson value.
This property means that the worth of coalition (m C , 0 N \C ) ∈ A C ×A N \C , where only the players of the component C participate and play their greatest activity level, is totally redistributed among themselves. In case (N, L) is a tree, i.e. the only component is N , this property is similar to the property of efficiency introduced by Hsiao and Rhagavan [1993] and others to characterize several extensions of the Shapley value [1953] from TU-games to multi-choice games. In such a special case, component efficiency becomes
The second property is a generalization of the property of component fairness from forest games to multi-choice forest games. Component fairness has been introduced by Herings et al. [2008] for the class of forest games. It says that deleting a link between two players yields for both resulting components the same average change in payoff, where the average is taken over the players in the component. To extend this property to the class of multi-choice games, we need the following definition. Given a forest (N, L) and a component C of (N, L), the subgraph (C, L(C)) is a tree. Therefore, deleting a link ij ∈ L(C) generates a bipartition {K ij , K ji } of C. The subset K ij of C is the element of the bipartition containing player i and K ji is the element of the bipartition containing player j. It follows that K ij and K ji constitute the two new components of the forest (N, L\ij). We say that the subsets K ij and K ji are the two cones of the forest induced by the link ij ∈ L(C). It follows that each component of size |C| possesses 2|C| − 2 cones.
Component fairness. An allocation rule f on C N satisfies component fairness if for each (A N , v, L) ∈ C N and each link ij ∈ L, it holds that
Component fairness for multi-choice forest games indicates that deleting a link between two players yields for both resulting components K ij and K ji of the forest (N, L\ij) the same average change in accumulated payoffs when each player chooses its greatest activity level, where the average is taken over the players in the component. On the class of forest games, Herings, et al. [2008] show that the combination of component efficiency and component fairness generates a unique allocation rules. This uniqueness result is no longer true on the class of multi-choice forest games since these two properties only concern accumulated payoffs. We thus introduce a new property, called independence on the greatest activity level, which states that the increase in payoff to player i corresponding to a change of activity from level k − 1 to k, where k = {0, m i }, does not depend on his greatest activity level m i . Independence on the greatest activity level. An allocation rule f on C N satisfies independence on the greatest activity level if for each (A N , v, L) ∈ C N such that there is i ∈ N with m i ≥ 2, it holds that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , m i − 1},
Remark: we could instead assume independence on the greater activity levels without modifying the results obtained in this article.
We now describe the solutions satisfying different combinations of the above list of properties. The first proposition states that if an allocation rule on the set of multi-choice forest games satisfies component efficiency and component fairness, then the accumulated payoffs of the members of a cone is the sum of two parts. One part is the worth of the coalition formed by the players of this cone when they play their greatest activity level and the second part is a share of a surplus generated by the deletion of the link when players of the component choose their greatest activity level. This share is precisely the relative size of this cone. Reciprocally, if the accumulated payoffs of the member of each cone is allocated as above, then the allocation rule satisfies component efficiency and component fairness. 
Proof. Assume that f satisfies component efficiency and component fairness on
, and delete any link ij ∈ L(C). By definition |C| = |K ij | + |K ji | and by component efficiency of f , we get:
Because |K ji | = |C| − |K ij |, component fairness can be rewritten as follows:
2) and (3.3) we deduce that
which is equivalent to write that
To show: f satisfies component efficiency and component fairness on C N . Pick any (A N , v, L) ∈ C N , any component C and any link ij ∈ L(C). By (3.1), we have
which proves that f satisfies component efficiency on C N . Next, by component efficiency and by (3.1), the variation of accumulated payoffs
In the same way,
It follows that
which proves that f satisfies component fairness on C N .
The following proposition provides a geometric interpretation of the accumulated payoffs received by each player when the allocation rule satisfies component efficiency and component fairness. 
Before proceeding to the proof of Proposition 3.2, it is instructive to consider the following interpretation of the allocation given by (3.4). First, the accumulated payoffs of each player is the sum of two parts. The first part distributes the worth of the coalition (m C , 0 N \C ) associated with the component C equally among its members and the second part is computed link by link.
, j ∈ L i , can be viewed as the oriented area of the parallelogram with vertices at (0, 0), (v(m K ij 
The oriented area is the same as the usual area, except that it is negative when the vertices are listed in clockwise order. Note also that the allocation process associated with a link ij has the zero-sum property: agent i receives det M (A N ,v,L) ij and agent j receives exactly
. In order to interpret this situation, assume that the connected component C forms and that the members of C choose their greatest activity level. Because L(C) is minimally connected all communication links are necessary to coordinate the actions inside C. Suppose that the link ij ∈ L(C) is broken. How should i and j be compensated? The determinant det M (A N ,v,L) ij offers a compensation scheme between i and j whose geometric interpretation in the form of an orientated area is quite natural.
Proof. Pick any allocation rule f that satisfies component efficiency and component fairness on C N . Pick any (A N , v, L) ∈ C N and consider any component C of (N, L) and i ∈ C. First note that
where the collection of cones K ji , j ∈ L i are pairwise disjoints. Therefore, by component efficiency we have:
By Proposition 3.1, we know that
or equivalently
Putting this expression in (3.6) and taking into account (3.5), we obtain that
which is precisely (3.4). Reciprocally, assume that for each (A N , v, L) ∈ C N and each i ∈ N , F {i} (A N , v, L) is given by (3.4). Pick any j ∈ L i and the induced cone K ji . By (3.4), we have:
The only ordered pair for which this relation is not true is the pair (j,
It follows that (3.7) reduces to
The right hand side of this equality can be rewritten as:
Since the equality between F K ji (A N , v, L) and (3.8) is true for each component C and each ij ∈ L(C), we conclude that f satisfies component efficiency and component fairness by an application of Proposition 3.1.
We now state the main result of this section, which indicates that there is a unique allocation rule on the class of multi-choice forest games that satisfies component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. In order to complete the proof of this result, it is useful to define for each k ≥ n, the subclass C k N of multi-choice forest games
and that
Notice also that Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 can be applied on each C k N .
Proposition 3.3 On the class of multi-choice forest games C N , there is a unique allocation rule that satisfies component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level.
Proof. Choose any allocation rule f on C N that satisfies component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. The proof is by induction on ||m||. Initial step: Pick any (A N , v, L) ∈ C N such that ||m|| = n. In such a case, v is the characteristic function of the TU-game (N, v) and (A N , v, L) is the forest game (N, v, L). On the class of forest games, only component efficiency and component fairness can be used. Note also that component efficiency and component fairness reduce to the corresponding properties introduced in Herings et al. [2008] . By Theorem 3.4 in Herings et al. [2008] , there is a unique allocation rule that satisfies component efficiency and component fairness on the class of forest games. Induction hypothesis: Assume that there is a unique allocation rule f that satisfies component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level on C k N for some k > n. Induction step: Pick any (A N , v, L) ∈ C k+1 N such that ||m|| = k + 1. Because k + 1 > n, there necessarily exists a player with at least two activity levels. Set Q {i} (A N , v, L) equals to the expression (3.4) found in Proposition 3.2. Next, for each ordered pair
By construction, for each i ∈ N , we have
. By the induction hypothesis and Proposition 3.2, f satisfies component efficiency and component fairness on C k+1 N . By construction and by the induction hypothesis f satisfies also independence on the greatest activity level. Therefore, we have shown that there is an allocation rule f that satisfies component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level on C k+1 N . Next, assume that there is another allocation rule g that satisfies component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level on the class C k+1 N . Pick any multi-choice forest games (A N , v, L) ∈ C k+1 N . By Proposition 3.2, we obtain that for each
. By the induction hypothesis and independence on the greatest activity level, for each (i, k) ∈ N × A i such that 1 ≤ k < m i we have
The average tree solution
Having proved that component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level uniquely determine an allocation rule on C N , we are now going to give a closed expression for this solution.
Consider a multi-choice forest game (A N , v, L) ∈ C N , and a root tree t r on the subgraph (C, L(C)) induced by the component C ∈ N/L. For each (i, k) ∈ V define the coalition a r,(i,k) ∈ A N with respect to the root r as follows:
otherwise.
The hierarchical outcome h r (A N , v, L) ∈ R V with respect to r ∈ C is the payoff vector defined as:
The payoff h r i,k (A N , v, L) to player i ∈ C choosing the activity level k = 0 is a marginal contribution vector in the sense it is equal to the worth with respect to v L of the coalition whose support contains the player i choosing the activity level k and all the subordinates of player i in t r when each one chooses his greatest activity level minus the worth of the same coalition except that player i chooses the activity level k −1 instead of k. In case
coincides with the hierarchical outcome defined by Demange [2004] . See also Khmelnitskaya [2010] and van den Brink [2009] for axiomatic characterizations of the hierarchical outcome in forest games. Here is a difference with the class of forest games. If k = 1, the support of a r,(i,k−1) is equal to the support of a r, (i,k) and so the coalition a r,(i,k) does not split into several components. If k = 1, then i no longer belongs to the support of the coalition a r, (i,0) . This support is constituted by the groups of players S r (j), j ∈ s r (i), and so Herings, et al. [2008] extend Demange's hierarchical outcome on forest games by considering the average of the hierarchical outcomes, where the average is taken over the set of rooted trees that we can create on each component of the forest. The authors show that the average of the hierarchical outcomes, also called the average tree solution, is the unique solution that satisfies component efficiency and component fairness. We propose an extension of this definition from forest game to multi-choice forest games.
On the class of multi-choice forest games C N , the average tree solution AT assigns to any
i.e. player i choosing the activity level k receives the average of his marginal contributions over the |C| rooted trees t r in (C, L(C)).
Proposition 4.1 On the class of multi-choice forest games C N , the average tree solution satisfies component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level.
Proof. Pick any (A N , v, L) ∈ C N any component C ∈ N/L and any root r ∈ C. We have
Using an induction argument on the number of elements of S r (j), one can easily check that for each j ∈ N ,
Because C = S r (r), we get
which proves that the average tree solution satisfies component efficiency.
To show component fairness, pick any link ij ∈ C and consider a root r ∈ K ji . By the above argument, we have:
Taking the average over all possible roots, we get:
On the other hand, by component efficiency of AT, it follows that
and so
is equal to
In the same way, it is easy to see that
is equal to (4.1), which proves that AT satisfies component fairness. By definition of the hierarchical outcome, it is immediate to verify that AT satisfies independence on the greatest activity level.
Combining Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 4.1, we derive the following characterization.
Proposition 4.2 On the class of multi-choice forest games C N , the average tree solution is the unique allocation rule which satisfies component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level.
Core stability
For the sake of presentation, we assume in this section that the communication graph is a tree. The discussion below can be adapted straightforwardly to the case where the communication graph is a forest. We first show that the average tree solution of a multi-choice tree game is stable in the sense that it belongs to its precore provided that the characteristic function is isotone and superadditive. We thus have the following result.
N is isotone and superadditive. Then,
If furthermore for each root r ∈ N , each player i ∈ N and each activity level k ∈ A i , it holds that
N such that v is isotone and superadditive and (N, L) is a tree. Because the precore is a convex set, it suffices to verify that any hierarchical vec- v, L) . In order to do this, consider the set V of all ordered pairs (i, k) where i ∈ N and k ∈ A i , and for each nonempty T ∈ 2 V define for each i ∈ N the set T i as the section of T at i, i.e.
by superadditivity of v and definition of w. On the other hand, we have b
The combination of (5.2) and (5.3) shows that (V, w) is a superadditive TU-game. Next, pick any root r in (N, L) and construct the forest game (V, w, L r ) where L r is defined as follows: for each i ∈ N , create the oriented links (i, k)(i, k − 1) for k ∈ A i \{0}. Furthermore, for each i ∈ N and each j ∈ s r (i), create the oriented link (i, 0)(j, m j ). Now let us focus on the rooted spanning tree of (V, L r ) obtained when the root is (r, m r ). See Example 5.2 below for an illustration. The hierarchical vector
Demange [2004] has shown that this hierarchical vector h (r,mr) (V, w, L r ) is an extreme point of the core of the restricted TU-game (V, w L r ) when the underlying TU-game (V, w) is superadditive, i.e.
. v, L) . To see this, pick any (i, k) ∈ V and consider the connected coalition S (r,mr) (i, k) ∈ 2 V formed by the subordinates of player (i, k) in the rooted spanning tree t (r,mr) of (V, L r ) and by player (i, k). The profile b S (r,mr ) (i,k) coincides with the profile a r, (i,k) in (A N , v, L) when the spanning tree of (N, L) is rooted at r. Therefore, w(S (r,mr) (i, k)) = v(a r, (i,k) ) and by construction of (V, L r ) and t (r,mr) , we get w
is an imputation and so it belongs to the core of (A N , v, L).
Example 5.2
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the player set and let (N, L) be the tree given by L = {12, 23, 24}. The sets of activity levels of players are the following: A 1 = A 2 = {0, 1, 2}, A 3 = {0, 1} and A 4 = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Consider player 1 as the root, which induces the rooted spanning tree t 1 . The extended tree of (N, L r ) and the rooted spanning tree t (1,2) is depicted below. (1, 0)
(1, 1)
Tree (N, L)
Rooted spanning tree t 1 Rooted spanning tree t (1,2)
The proof of Proposition 5.1 reveals that the average tree solution for multi-choice tree games (A N , v, L) can be expressed as the average of hierarchical vectors of the tree games (V, w, L r ), r ∈ N , where the associated spanning tree of each (V, L r ) is rooted at (r, m r ). Note that we can not assert that the average tree solution for (A N , v, L) is an average tree solution constructed from a given TU-game (V, w) and a fixed tree. The reason is that for each root r of (N, L), we have to construct a new L r and so a new root spanning tree t (r,mr) . To illustrate this aspect, consider again Example 5.2 and choose 2 as the root of the tree (N, L). The tree (V, L 2 ) and the corresponding rooted spanning tree t (2,2) are drawn on the same figure, and we see that
Proposition 5.3 For each multi-choice tree game (N, A N , L) ∈ C * N , the average tree solution assigns to each pair (i, k) ∈ N × A i the payoff
where the TU-game (V, w) and the trees (V, L r ), r ∈ N , are defined in the proof of Proposition 5.1. Rooted spanning tree t 2
Rooted spanning tree t (2,2)
Applications
Many economic situations can be modeled as multi-choice graph games. In this section, we consider two applications. This first one concerns the problem of coordination of different production activities in a industry and the second one is a cooperative model of price formation.
Coordination of economic activities
A finite set of firms N = {1, 2, . . . , n} are engaged in carrying out n distinct inputs. Each firm is specialized in the production of exactly one input and each input is produced by exactly one firm. The combination of all inputs is a necessary and sufficient condition in order to complete production of the output. The production level depends on the quantity of inputs used by the cooperating firms. More precisely, the set of quantities of input available for each firm i ∈ N is the finite set A i = {0, 1, . . . , m i }. The characteristic function v : A N −→ R is a Leontief technology given by the supermodular function
Supermodularity implies increasing differences on A N [see Topkis, 1998, Theorem 2.6.1], i.e. for all distinct firms i ∈ N and j ∈ N , for all a i ≥ b i and a j ≥ b j , and for all a −ij ∈ A N \{i,j} , it holds that
which means that the additional production resulting from the availability of any additional unit of input of firm i is increasing with the quantity of input of firm j, all other things being equal. This property reflects the complementarities between the different activities of the process of production in the sense that the set of inputs are different phases of this process. The dependencies among this set of inputs are represented by a tree (N, L), where a link represents the "technological externalities" between two inputs that are closely complementary. Technological externalities refer to the benefits of economic interactions which take place through nonmarket mechanisms, such as bilateral communication between firms. The combination of inputs is undertaken sequentially. A rooted spanning tree describes the positions of the inputs in this order, with the convention that the root is the last input undertaken. Denote by m the worth v(m) of the grand coalition m. For each pair (i, k) ∈ N × A i , we have
Because each firm is exactly the root of one spanning tree among the set of n spanning trees, the average tree solution assigns to the k-th unit of input i the following payoff:
It follows that when a firm i chooses to put m i units of inputs in the process of production, the average marginal contribution of the firm to the m units of output is
Not all units of inputs are rewarded since adding extra units of input does not always increase the quantity of output. To see this, recall that when the grand coalition form, the quantity produced is v(m) = m = v(m, . . . , m), which means that the process of production consumes at least m units of each input. One possible interpretation is that the average tree solution measures the average marginal contribution of each of these first m units to the production of m units of output. The marginal contribution of each of these units of input is equal to 1 when the input is the last to enter in the process of production, and zero otherwise. Since each input enters exactly once in the last position, its average marginal contribution is 1/n. Derks and Peters [1993] propose a multi-choice Shapley value. One can readily check that this Shapley value of the multi-choice game (A N , v) coincides with the average tree solution of (A N , v, L) in this cooperative model of production. This implies that the average tree solution does not depend on the communication tree. The reason is that there is no substitutability among inputs. In the next application, we provide a model of spatial price formation in which the location of a firm on the tree is crucial.
Cooperation in a Hotelling model
Consider a city with a population distributed among a network of roads, represented by a tree of order n ∈ N. Each firm i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is located at a node of the tree, denoted by (N, L). For simplicity, the length of each link is equal to one, and assimilated to the line segment [0, 1], and firms sell a homogeneous product at zero cost. There is a continuum of consumers (of unit mass) distributed on each link with unit density. Each firm i ∈ N chooses a unique price p i ∈ A i = {0, 1, . . . , m i } for the roads ij ∈ L i , where the activity level p i = 0 means that firm i does not participate on its markets. On each road ij ∈ L, each consumer buys exactly one unit of the product from the firm (i or j) that charges the lowest full price, i.e. the price fixed by the firm plus the linear transportation cost to that firm. This model is a natural extension of the Hotelling [1929] model with fixed locations from a linear city to a city shaped as a tree. For each road ij ∈ L, it is known that if the two firms participate, the market share of firm i is (p j − p i + t) 2t , while firm j's market share is
where t is the unit transportation cost. We assume t > max i∈N m i so as to ensure that the market shares are always positive. If a unique firm participates on the market associated to road ij ∈ L, then its market share is 1. It follows that R i (0, p j ) = 0 and R j (0, p j ) = p j . The total revenues of firms i and j when they both participate are given by
Define v : A N −→ R as
Consider the market associated with any road ij ∈ L. When firm i reduces its price p i of one unit, we can distinguish three types of variation of the firms' revenues on this market. If p i > 1 and p j > 1, then straightforward calculations show that
If p i = 1 and p j ≥ 1, then we have
Finally, if p i ≥ 1 and p j = 0 we get R i (p i , 0) − R i (p i − 1, 0) = 1 and R j (p i , 0) − R j (p i − 1, 0) = 0.
In order to compute the average tree solution, pick any root r ∈ N . For each i ∈ N \{r} and each p i ∈ A i \{0, 1}, we have (1 − m j ) (m j − 1 + t) 2t .
When firm i decides to not participate instead of charging a unit price on the market associated with road ij, the other firm j can behave as a monopoly on this market. The total revenues of both firms on the market will be greater whenever m j > 1 if firm i decides to not participate. The above two expressions highlights this feature. We conclude that the average tree solution assigns to every firm i the following payoff variations. If p i > 1, (1 − m j ) (m j − 1 + t) 2t
Each payoff variation AT i,p i (A N , v, L) measures the share of the total profit generated along the roads of the city which can be attributed to the p i -th unit of the price m i charged by firm i.
In the absence of transportation cost, the model resumes to a cooperative version of a spatial Bertrand game. On each road ij, the market share of firm i is 1 if p i < p j , 1/2 if p i = p j and 0 if p i > p j . In such a model, the average tree solution assigns to every firm i choosing price p i , the payoff variation
